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LBcrsLAnoN-lNVALIDITY OF STATUTES FRAMED IN VAGUB TERMs*-De-

fendant, president of a corporation which processes apples for shipment in
interstate commerce, was convicted of violating §301(£) of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.1 That section prohibits "the refusal to permit entry oi inspection
as authorized by section 704"; section 7042 authorizes federal officers, "after
fust making request and obtaining permission of the owner, operator or custodian" of the factory "to enter" and "to inspect" the establishment "at reasonable
times." Federal authorities requested permission to enter and inspect defendant's

.. For

adifferent interpretation and analysis of the Cardiff case, see companion note in

this issue at p. 922.-Ed.
1
2

52 Stat. L. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. (1946) §331(£).
52 Stat. L. 1057 (1938), 21 U.S.C. (1946) §374.
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factory at reasonable hours, but permission was refused. This refusal was the
basis of the conviction.3 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 4
Certiorari was granted; held, affirmed. A criminal statute is invalid if it does
not give fair and effective notice of what acts are prohibited. United States v.
Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 73 S.Ct. 189 (1952).
An argument frequently presented to attack legislation couched in general
terms is that the language of the particular statute is so indefinite and vague
as to be invalid. This type of attack calls for special scrutiny of the language
by the reviewing court in the case of criminal statutes, although the principle
is applicable to legislation of a civil nature as well. 5 Since hanging a "void-forvagueness" decision on some constitutional peg has become an accepted technique, the principal case is of interest in that it does not purport expressly to
rest the ruling on any constitutional grounds. 6 The statute prohibited refusal to
allow inspection only if permission had previously been granted. The Court
stated that it was unable to make sense out of the language; neither of two
alternative constructions apprises a businessman of what conduct will be deemed
criminal. If the statute means that revocation of permission once given is illegal,
a Hock of uncertainties arises;7 while if it means that inspection is conditioned on
permission which it is unlawful to refuse, the absurdity is more patent yet.
Although the Court discussed the lack of fair notice to defendant and cited in
passing two cases decided on due process grounds,8 no constitutional issue was
referred to by the court below nor mentioned in the Supreme Court's opinion.
It is submitted that in this kind of case a matter to be examined even before a
constitutional issue9 is reached is whether the legislature has in fact passed a
Zaw-i.e., a rule prescribing certain minimum standards of conduct. Just as a
string of nonsense syllables enacted by a legislature fails to warrant such a desiga United States v. Cardiff, (D.C. Wash. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 206.
Cardiff v. United States, (9th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 686.
5 See, e.g., Small C. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 45 S.Ct. 295
(1925), in which the Court said in referring to cases declaring the criminal provisions of
the same act invalid, at 239, "It was not the criminal penalty that was held invalid, but the
exaction of obedience to a rule or standard which was so vague and indefinite as really to be
no rule or standard at all."
6 See article by Aigler, "Legislation in Vague or General Terms," 21 MxcH. L. RBv.
831 (1923), in which the author urges the point that often holdings of invalidity because
of indefiniteness need not be tied to any particular constitutional inhibition.
7 ''Would revocation of permission once given carry the criminal penalty no matter
how long ago it was granted and no matter if it had no relation to the inspection demanded?
Or must the permission granted and revoked relate to the demand for inspection on which
the prosecution is based?" Douglas, J., in principal case at 176.
s United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298 (1921); Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732 (1937).
9 Indefinite language in legislation has been held to violate the following types of state
and federal constitutional provisions: due process clauses (5th and 14th Amendments, state
constitutions); protection of right to be informed of nature of accusation (6th Amendment,
state constitutions); ex post facto clauses [on theory that jury determines nature of offense
after vague legislation seems to permit certain conduct; see Ex parte Jackson, 45 Ark. 158
(1885)]; uulawful delegation of legislative powers [e.g., People ex rel. Duffy v. Hurley, 402
ill. 562 at 573, 85 N.E. (2d) 26 (1949)]; cruel and unusual punishment [Stoutenberg v.
Frazier, 16 App. Cas. (D.C. 1900) 229].
4
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nation, so should an attempted law fail ab initio if it does not furnish the
mythical person of ordinary intelligence an understandable external rule of
conduct. In such a case the language has no meaning and is simply inoperative
and void. 10 Many of the early state and federal cases involving indefinite language seem to have been decided on this basis,11 and there have been scattered
federal12 and state18 decisions in recent years invalidating statutes for vagueness
with no mention of constitutional problems in the opinions. Often the approach
of the court will make little practical difference. However, situations arise when
the distinction may become important. Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court on state statutes must necessarily come up via the Fourteenth Amendment;
in Ohio a statute may not be declared unconstitutional unless all but one of the
supreme court justices so decide;14 in North Dakota no law may be declared
unconstitutional unless at least four (of the five) supreme court justices so
decide;15 in Indiana cases presenting constitutional issues are appealable directly
to the supreme court, by-passing the court of appeals;16 in Alabama a declaratory
opinion by the justices of the supreme court may be requested by the governor
only upon constitutional issues.17 The argument that legislation is "uncertain,
indefinite, and vague" is frequently made in the cases. Inasmuch as courts
demonstrate a reluctance to label a statute unconstitutional, it is possible that the
principal case will be generally interpreted and applied as modem precedent for
the proposition that indefinitely-worded legislation may be avoided simply as
inoperative for failure to provide an ascertainable rule of conduct,18 without
resort to constitutional inquiries.
Richard W. Pogue, S.Ed.
10 "A prohibition so indefinite as to be unintelligible is not a prohibition by which
conduct can be governed. It is not a rule at all; it is merely exhortation and entreaty."
Cardozo, J., in Standard C. & M. Corp. v. Waugh C. Corp., 231 N.Y. 51 at 54, 131 N.E.
566 (1921) (decided on basis of due process precedents).
11 The first federal case invalidating legislation for indefiniteness, The Enterprise, 1
Paine (C.C. 1810) 32, Fed. Cas. No. 4499, is sometimes cited solely for the proposition
that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, 45 HARV, L. Rnv. 160, n. 1 (1931).
12 United States v. 1010.8 Acres, (D.C. Del. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 120 at 140; Varney
v. Warehime, (6th Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 238 at 244. .
18 Wilcox v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A. (2d) 521 (1947) (community property law invalidated); State v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 55 N.M. 395, 234
P. (2d) 339 (1951) (severance tax law invalid as to oil and gas industry); State v. Bryant,
219 Ark. 313, 241 S.W. (2d) 473 (1951) ("small farm vehicles" too vague); State v.
Morrison, 210 N.C. 117, 185 S.E. 674 (1936) (license statute void for uncertainty).
14 Omo CoNsT., art. IV, §2 (1948). See remarks by Aigler, ''Legislation in Vague or
General Terms," 21 l\hcH. L. Rnv. 831 (1923), on Patten v. Aluminum Castings Co., 105
Ohio 1, 136 N.E. 426 (1922), in which a bare majority of the court held a statute invalid
for indefiniteness.
15 NORTH DAKOTA CONST. §89 (1943).
16 Jnd. Stat. (Burns, 1946 replacement) §4-214.
17 Ala. Code (1940), tit. 13, §34. In Opinion by the Justices, 249 Ala. 88, 30 S.
(2d) 14 (1947), the members of the court informed the governor that while the act in
question violated none of several constitutional provisions, nonetheless its vagueness rendered it inoperative and void.
18 This may be required by statute. ''Whenever it appears that a provision of the penal
law is so indefinitely framed or of such doubtful construction that it cannot be understood
••• such penal law shall be regarded as wholly inoperative." Texas Penal Code (1952)
art. 6.

